Quartalsvorlesungen | Quarterly Lectures

Mit den Quarterly Lectures on Philosophy of Science starten wir 2022 eine neue Vortragsreihe, für die wir auf Vorschlag von Student*innen bekannte Philosoph*innen und Wissenschaftler*innen für einen 60-Minuten Vortrag mit anschließenden 60 Minuten Diskussion einladen ihre Forschung für Bachelor- und Masterstudierende vorzustellen (Vorschläge bitte an: seminar(at)philosophiederphysik.de). Die Vorträge werden auf Deutsch oder Englisch gehalten. Alle Interessierten sind herzlich eingeladen. Der Zoom-Link wird über diese Seite veröffentlicht, auch etwaige Vorbereitungsmaterialien werden hier zugänglich gemacht.

With the Quarterly Lectures on Philosophy of Science, we are starting a new lecture series in 2022: we invite well-known philosophers and scientists to present their research to bachelor's and master's students through a 60-minute lecture followed by a 60-minute discussion (please send suggestions to: seminar(at)philosophiederphysik.de). The lectures will be held in German or English. All interested parties are cordially invited. The zoom link will be published via this page, and any preparatory materials will also be made available here.


Programme 2022

Organised by Oxana Shaya (RWTH Aachen), Niels Linnemann (University of Bremen/Rotman) and Kian Salimkhani (University of Cologne).

4th Quarterly Lecture
Kerry McKenzie
9. December 2022 (19:00 CET)

Physics, Metaphysics, and the Problem of Progress


Zoom link: tba; Background reading: McKenzie (2020)


Abstract: Metaphysics is often held to be continuous with science. And in many respects it is: it has similar aims and may even employ a similar methodology. However, it is arguably very different in one crucial respect: while science clearly makes progress, it is very much less clear that metaphysics does. This gravely impacts the value of engaging in metaphysics of physics prior to a final theory. Or so I think: in this talk I will explain why I believe this, and respond to some objections that have been made to my argument.

3rd Quarterly Lecture
Anjan Chakravartty
19. August 2022 (16:00 CEST)

On the Relationship between Scientific Realism and Scientific Metaphysics


Video


Abstract: Debates about scientific realism (the idea that our best theories and models are substantially on the right track, epistemically, and increasingly so), and debates about scientific or naturalized metaphysics (the idea that, in order to be on the right epistemic track, metaphysical theorizing should be intimately connected to scientific theorizing), are generally conducted in isolation from one another. As it happens, though, these two debates are, in fact, interwoven, because different approaches to scientific realism reflect different approaches to naturalized metaphysics, and antirealist arguments in the former domain have correlates in the latter. In this talk, I explore the relationship between scientific realism and scientific metaphysics, the extent to which their fates are linked, and the sense in which they are not.

2nd Quarterly Lecture
Emily Adlam
23. June 2022 (18:15 CEST)

Operational Theories as Structural Realism


Video


Abstract: In this talk I will introduce the operational theories approach to research in quantum foundations and undertake a reconstruction of the epistemic significance of this research. I argue that the space of operational theories is analogous to the space of possible worlds employed in the possible world semantics for modal logic, so research of this sort can be understood as probing modal structure. Thus I will argue that operational axiomatisations of quantum mechanics may be interpreted as a novel form of structural realism; I discuss the consequences of this interpretation for the philosophy of structural realism and the future of operational theories.

1st Quarterly Lecture
Bas van Fraassen
21. March 2022 (19:00 CET)

Epistemological implications of Bell's inequality


Video, Script; Background reading: Mermin (1981)


Abstract: I will quickly rehearse the schematic form of the Aspect experiment to test Bell’s Inequalities. Then I will first explain how those inequalities can be deduced if we assume Reichenbach’s common cause principle, and next, if we assume counterfactual definiteness (made precise in terms of conditionals). Finally, there is still the challenge of how to go on once we have to give up traditional ways of thinking, and here I will advocate an empiricist stance toward modality.